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The Slovene Chamber of Pharmacy not long ago announced an increase in 
prices for the medicines. As a reason they have stated a higher volume of medicines 
and higher quality treatment  of consumers. This gave them  the right to higher 
revenues. At the same time the Chamber of Pharmacy achieved, that the first internet 
based pharmacy, which  was established by private pharmacist (their potential 
competitor) was closed. 
1  
Above example shows a common way for an increase in the prices in the non-
tradable sector of the Slovene economy. If the none-competitive structure of the none-
tradable sector is one of the main causes of Slovene inflation,
2 the optimal monetary 
policy should focus on the abolishment of this disproportion's (Bole, 2003). In an 
open economy, monetary policy should steam to dampen down the supply shocks, 
that are caused by increase in the prices in the none-tradable sector. Even if there exist 
a complete exchange-rate pass-through, targeting reduction of the domestic inflation 
remains a key factor, regardless of the fact, that such targeting causes a variability of 
exchange rate, which has a direct impact on the inflation. Otherwise the successful 
reduction of the inflation, the competitiveness of the tradable sector and the long run 
growth of a economy would be at stake (Aoki, 1999; Gali and Monaceli, 2000; 
Clarida et. al. 2001). 
In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the tradable sector of the Slovene 
economy to the external shocks. To known distortions, that have roots in market 
failures in the domestic markets (none-competitiveness of the none-tradable sector, 
distortions in the labor markets...) we add the specific behavior of Slovene firms in 
foreign markets. In comparison with their global competitors, their economic power is 
very small. Their sales depends heavily on a small number of buyers ( truncated 
firm).
3 Hence entry and exit costs (switching costs) of Slovene firms are large. This is 
especially true for their main exporting market i.e. European Union (EU) markets. 
When the absorption power of the exporting market declines,  firms still trade with 
                                                                 
1 Delo, 28th and 29th April 2003. 
2 More on market failure and inflation can be found in  Chinn and Johnston (1999) and Cheung et.al 
(1999). 
3 The term truncated firm stands for a  firm that heavily depends on a small number of big buyers and 
is not yet fully developed. (i.e. restructuring process is still taking place). According to the size of the 
firm and development of their business functions, majority of Slovene firms can be classified into a 
"middle" firms (Debeljak et. al., 2002; Snaith and Walker, 2002).  their established buyers (hysteresis), despite the fact, that due to lower prices,  their 
exporting revenues decline. However in case of the unexpected and long-term decline 
of absorption power or in case of the unsatisfactory policy that would lead to the 
reduction of the competitiveness of the tradable sector, a huge number of firms would 
exit from the foreign markets.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in section 2 with the presentation of 
hysteresis,  which is present on key Slovene exporting markets. We explain the 
hysteresis with the sunk costs. In third section we developed a model that tries to 
explain the persistence of Slovene firms in EU markets. We show that the persistence 
can be explained with the high exit costs. The firm that makes most of it revenues in 
EU, remains in that markets despite the fact, that this worsens the financial success of 
it. This is especially true in case of a decline of the absorption power of EU i.e. 
decline in the growth rate of EU markets. The decline in demand leads to reduction in 
the cash flow and in order to continue the production, firms need to take loans. 
However indebtedness is limited. Banks namely give loans based on the expected 
solvency that can be seen as the credit rating of a firm. As a result, the negative 
external shock could be devastating for the exporting part of the Slovene economy. 
We conclude in section 4.  
 
 
2. Hysteresis in participation of Slovene firms in exporting markets 
 
  Baldwin (1988), Dixit (1989) and Krugman (1989) explain asymmetric 
responses  of firms on a real exchange rate changes by a sunk costs, that firms face 
when they enter or/and  exit a market. When the firm  enters a foreign market needs to 
cover the entry costs, which later on become sunk. As a result the entry conditions are 
different as the exit ones. Entry price, that needs to cover both the operational and the 
sunk cost, is in case of zero exit cost higher, than the exit price, that needs to cover 
only operational costs. In case of none zero exit cost this price can even fall below a 
operational costs, while firms do not exit the market.  Due to the sunk costs, the current number of exporters depends on the type and number of exporters in the 
previous period. This leads to hysteresis in the exporting flows. 
4 
  Many Slovene firms have long exporting tradition on the developed western 
markets (mainly  on EU). Entry cost of the majority of Slovene firms on these markets 
are not small. They can be explained either with a establishment of long term 
production relationship with permanent buyers
5 or with a high cost of forming its own 
distribution and sales network and  a creation of the trade marks in this markets.
6 
  Before 1991 Slovene firms were also heavily present in the former Yugoslav 
markets and in the former socialist countries, mainly in Russia. At the fall of the 
Berlin wall and the succession of the former Yugoslavia many of them exited. At the 
end of nineties of previous century and at the beginning of this century they slowly 
started to re-enter. The re-entry of Slovene firms is due to finding new opportunities 
which are available with opening of these markets  and with lower entry cost that 
Slovene firms face compared to other foreign competitors  The last is a consequence 
of past participation of  Slovene firms on these markets. 
  It has to be noted that increased participation of Slovene firms in former 
Yugoslav markets and Russia is not a simple redirection of export from developed 
countries to new (old) market. In the second part of nineties of the previous century 
Slovene firms made substantial investment in their production. This investment cycle 
was based on stable demand in EU (Domadenik et. al., 2002). Since the conditions on 
EU are worsening the increase in a demand in former Yugoslav markets and Russia 
allows firms to fill the excess  capacities. However they do not decrease the sales to 
EU. Namely on one side would the exit from EU market lead to high exit costs 
(compensation money for excess workers)  and on the other side would later re-entry 
on EU, that could be caused with lower profitability (high risk) of the new markets, 
require also a high entry costs.  
                                                                 
4 The effect of sunk entry costs on export participation of firms is analyzed by a number of authors. 
Feinberg (1992) finds that relative increases in a number of companies are smaller for industries with 
large sunk costs. Campa (1993) finds that the entry of exporters to the United States is negatively 
correlated to the variability of a exchange rate and a size of the entry costs. Roberts and Tybout (1997) 
reject the null hypothesis that sunk costs have no effect on the export participation of Columbian 
manufacturing plants. Das et al. (2001) with the help of a dynamic model evaluate the size of sunk 
costs using a plant-panel data on the Columbian chemical producers. 
 
5 An example of such long run business  relationship which usually requires also asset specific 
investment are Prevent, that produces seats for Volkswagen and Mura, that produces cloths for  Hugo 
Boss. 
6 A good example is Gorenje.    Next we present a model of an entry with sunk cost. which we will later on 
estimate on the  export participation data of Slovene firms in period 1992-2001. 
 
2.1. Model of entry with sunk costs 
 
Consider a company that is producing a single product, and is deciding to 
enter a given foreign market. Suppose that the profit maximizing quantity is one unit 
per year, so that the revenue from the project is simply the output price P in the home 
currency and P* in the foreign currency. Let ? be the rate of interest and w be the 
operating cost of doing business in a foreign market.  
Under the standard Marshallian theory, there exist entry and exit prices  H P  
and L P , which are determined by cost of capital, operating costs and sunk investment. 
The company accepts the project (enters the market) if the price of the product (in the 
home currency) exceeds the sum of operating costs an annualized cost of capital: 
 
[1]  k w P ? ? ? ?  
 
Equation (1) can be rewritten by replacing the right hand side of the equation 
with  H P , that represents the price that triggers entry:  
 
[2]  H P P ?  
 
If the company is already present in the market, it remains there if price P 
exceeds at least operating costs w: 
 
[3]  w P ?  
 
Operating costs w represent the lower limit  L P , which triggers exit if price of 
the product P falls below it. Values  H P  and  L P   determine the conditions for entry 
and exit of the company.  
The presence of sunk costs apparently induces asymmetrical responses of 
companies to changes in export conditions, such as changes in the exchange rate. Reaction of the company to changes in price P depends largely on whether the 
company exported during the previous period.  
Imagine now that price P is currently between  H P   and  L P . If we are not 
familiar with company’s previous exporting status, we are not able to tell if the 
company is currently present in the market. Namely if the company was present in a 
given export market in the previous period, it is also currently present since price P 
exceeds exit price  L P  . On the other hand, if the company was not present in the 
market in the previous period, it will remain absent also in the current period since 
price P does not exceed entry price  H P .  
Expressing c ompanies' current exporting status with a binary variable Y t, 
where Yt =1 if a company is present in the export market and Yt =0 otherwise, we can 
write the necessary condition for a company to be present in the market as: 
 
[4]  1 ) ( ? ? ? ? ? t L H H Y P P P P  
 
It can be seen that company’s current export participation depends on current 
export price P and previous exporting status Y t-1. If equation (4) holds, then the 
company is present in the export market. In more general terms, we can write 
equation (4) in a slightly different way by replacing price P, entry price PH and exit 
price PL with gross export profits ( t ? ), investment size k and cost of capital ?:  
 
[5]  ) 1 ( t t Y k ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
Equation (5) is similar to equation (4), where instead of prices P, PH and PL , 
we use gross export profits, cost of capital and previous market participation to 
describe export market participation. 
As noted earlier, this represents only a simplified explanation of the hysteresis 
effect under the standard Marshallian theory
7. Under the option pricing theory
8, other 
factors besides previous exporting experience and current price (current exchange 
rate) affect current market participation. Under this approach, companies choose 
among different alternatives upon expected net present value of future cash inflows 
                                                                 
7 More in Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and outflows of each alternative, which are governed by stochastic processes, where 
they take into consideration all the variables that affect the  net present value (NPV).  
Under the standard theory, a company decides to enter if price P exceeds entry 
value H P  (if the NPV of this alternative is positive). Under the option theory, if 
current price P equals entry price  H P ,  the company will not enter because it can do 
better by waiting. In reality, price changes are affected by numerous factors, where 
many of them are stochastic in nature. In explaining why the company is better off 
waiting, we have to analyze different scenarios of future developments. In the most 
simple scenario, assume that only changes can come through changes in price where 
for the sake of simplicity both possibilities are equally likely. Meaning, that price can 
either increase or decrease in the future with a probability of one half. The NPV of 
entering option when price P equals entry price PH is obviously 0. On the other hand, 
the option of not entering is more attractive. Namely, if the price falls in the future, a 
company will not enter, where the NPV of this option is 0; but if it rises, a company 
can enter and have positive economic profit since inflows exceed sum of operating 
and cost of capital. Since both possibilities are equally likely (with probability one 
half) the NPV of the non-entering option, which is an equally weighted sum of the 
two possibilities of price movement, is positive.  
The NPV of the non-entering option is higher than the  NPV of the entering 
option. Due to that, a price that triggers entry under the option theory is higher then 
under the standard explanation of hysteresis effect. A question that arises is: why 
should a company enter at all if it can only gain by waiting? When analyzing the NPV 
of the non-entering option, we have to consider that company also looses by not 
entering, since it sacrifices current exporting profits in the case when revenues exceed 
the sum of operating costs and cost of capital. Eventually for some higher price P 
(bigger then P H), the sacrifice of current profits becomes more important and the 
company decides to enter. Under the option theory, the entry price is thus higher then 
under the standard approach.  
   More generally the participation condition can be written as:  
 
[6]  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ,
0 ? ? ? ? ? ? it it t i i it it Y Y F Y ? ?  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 As in Dixit (1989), Robrts and Tybout (1997), Das et al. (2001) where  ) 1 ( ? it it Y ?  represent expected gross profits of the entering option in 
period t,  ) 0 ( ? it it Y ? gross exporting profits of the  non-entering option in period t, and 
) 1 ( 1 ,
0
? ? t i i Y F the sunk costs of entry (if the company is not yet present). 
From equation (6), one can implicitly assume that entry cost are the same for 
new companies (those that were never present in that market) and companies with 
previous exporting experience in that market. In equation (6), we thus ignore the 
possibility that entry cost may depend on company’s exporting history dating back 
further than just one year. 
Due to the fact, that entry cost are composed of start up cost of establishing 
distribution channels, brand name etc, it is reasonable to assume that the entry cost in 
the case where  a company is returning to the market are lower than if the company 
had never been there before. If we allow past exporting history to influence current 
exporting status, we must include another term into equation (6): 
 
[7]  ?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
2
,
0
1 ,
0 ~
) ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 (
j
j t i i
j
i t i i it it it it Y F F Y F Y Y ? ?  
 
Equation (7) resembles equation (6), the only difference being in the added 
term (last term equation 7), which captures the effects of past exporting experience. 
Here  j t i Y ? ,
~
 summarizes company’s most recent exporting experience ( j t i Y ? ,
~
is 1 if a 
company was last in export market J years ago and zero otherwise) and 
j
i F  are the 
according sunk costs of entry. The current exporting status can thus be written as: 
 
 [8] 
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
?
? ?
otherwise
Y F F Y F Y Y
Y
i J
j
j t i i
j
i t i i it it it it
it
...... 0
0
~
) ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ....... 1
2
,
0
1 ,
0 ? ?
 
 
There are two ways we may precede in estimating equation (8). We could 
develop a structural model of export participation that would be based on specific 
assumptions. Alternatively we can approximate 
0 ) 0 ( ) 1 ( i it it it it F Y Y ? ? ? ? ? ?  as a 
reduced form expression of company characteristics and time-specific effects that 
reflects changes in business environment. Because a great number of approximations (which limit the applicability of the model) are required for the development of 
structural model, and since we are not interested in the exact values of correlation 
coefficient but only in the signs of correlation coefficients (positive or negative), we 
use the reduced form equation. As mentioned, we assume that the difference in 
expected gross profits of the two possible options is a function of company’s specific 
characteristics Zit, changes in business conditions ?t that are common to all firms and 
error term ?it : 
 
. [9]   it it t i it it it it Z F Y Y ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
0 ) 0 ( ) 1 (  
 
 
Substituting equation (9) into (8) 
 
[10] 
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
?
? ?
otherwise
Y F F Y F Z
Y
it
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j
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In order to identify the model, we must make additional restrictions.  Firstly 
we assume that companies that have not exported for more then two years face the 
same entry cost. Secondly, we assume that the entry costs are equal for all companies 
( j
j
i c F ? ).  Applying the two assumptions brings us to a simplified version of 
equation (10): 
 
 
[11] 
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ?
otherwise
Y c Y Y c Y c b Z ce
Y
t i i t i t i t i t i it
it
..... 0
0 ) 1 ( . ..... 1 , 1990 , 3 2 , 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 ? ? ?
? ?
 
 
Another term that was included in equation (11)  is  1990 , i Y  (we will refer to this 
variable as pp90), a binary variable that takes value 1 if a company was present on a 
given market before 1991 and z ero otherwise. In most cases, Slovenian companies 
have been active on markets of EU, Russia and Yugoslavia even before 1991. Positive 
values of coefficient pp90 can thus indicate that companies present on a given market are mainly those that were present t here before 1991. It can also mean that the 
presence of the company is to great extent determined by investments conducted 
before 1991. Alternatively, can the persistence of companies on a given market be 
explained by unobservable characteristics of companies that are not necessarily linked 
to sunk cost. 
Before moving on to estimation and results, we discuss our data set and export 
patterns of Slovene companies. 
 
 
2.2. Variable statistics and data sample 
 
2.2.1.  Nonrandom samples 
 
We evaluate the effect of sunk costs on the export decisions of Slovene firms 
on the export  markets on a panel of approximately 160 large and medium Slovene 
firms. The sample represent 32% of Slovenian export revenues in year 2000, 18,9 % 
of all employees, 25% of profits and 8% of balance sheet capital. The sample is none-
random. Despite that, we believe, that our sample is relevant for analyzing the effects 
of sunk costs on export participation of Slovene firms, since it contains core firms of 
Slovene economy.  
The panel contains data from publicly available information, such as balance 
sheet, income statement etc, and non-publicly available information (export revenues 
on different markets, investments in physical capital…), which were obtained via a 
questionnaire. For some firms we were unable to obtain all the data, mainly the data 
about export participation and value of the revenues in exporting markets before 
1996. Also some firms were created in the observed period. As a result the number of 
firms that have complete data on share of revenues to different markets in the period 
1992-2001 is a bit smaller (110 firms). In the period 1996-2001, the number of firms 
with complete data is bigger (155 firms). The latest data set contains also the firm 
heterogeneity data (i.e. ownership structure...). Namely the privatization process was 
finished in  a year 1995. For 112 firms out of 155, we were able also to obtain the 
credit rating information from Nova Ljubljanska Bank. In table 1 we show summary 
statistics and standard deviations of the variables  that are used in our analysis. They 
are presented for three samples of firms explained above.  According to the classification of SURS firms are classified in five groups of 
industries:  1) food and beverages; 2) chemical, oil and rubber products; 3) metal, 
electrical and optical industry; 4) retail, wholesale and 5) miscellaneous.  
 
2.2.2.  Entry and exit 
 
First we show entry and exit dynamics of Slovene firms to different export 
markets (EU, Russia and countries of former Yugoslavia). In table 2 and 3 we present 
number of entering and exiting firms by year for different markets.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from tables 2 and 3.  Fist, majority of 
Slovene firms were present in EU markets even before Slovenia declared its 
independence (1991). Out of 155 firms, 65% were operating in EU markets already in 
year 1990. In year 2001 this share was 77%. A bit more than 30 firms did not enter to 
EU market in observed period 1992-2001. The entry to EU market was more heavily 
present at the beginning of nineties  (especially in the year 1992), while there is 
basically no exit from the EU markets. Second, Russian market is very volatile for 
Slovene firms. Entry of firms to Russian market were more common at the beginning 
of nineties and at the end on  nineties and especially in years 2000-2001, while 
majority of exit happened in the period of the Russian crisis (1998-1999). Third, the 
participation of Slovene firms on markets of the former Yugoslavia was highest 
before 1990. Namely 73% of the firms (out of observed 155) were present in these 
market also in year 2001. Immediately after Slovenia declared its independence, the 
number of Slovene firms present in the former YU market declined. The exit was the 
biggest in BIH and FRY. Also a lot of firms exited from the Croatia and Macedonia  
at this period. The biggest entry to former YU markets happened in year 1996. That is 
probably the consequences of the Dayton agreement. While the entry after year 1996 
is pretty stable in the Croatia and BIH, the FRY and  Macedonia show cyclical 
movements that can be explained with political situation in these countries.  In last 
two years, Slovene firms started to enter the FRY markets on a bigger scale.  
Among the firms who exported to EU at least once , 91.4% of them (longer 
time period sample) and 94.4% ( shorter time period sample) were permanently 
present in EU market. Among the firms who changed their exporting status in EU 
markets has done that basically once (80% of firms in long time period sample and 
83.4% of firms in short time period sample). On other markets the positive trend of export participation is less present. For the Russia, among the firms that exported to it 
at least once, 34.6% and 48.7% were permanently present in its market in long and 
short time period sample, respectively. For the Croatia, BIH, FRY and Macedonia 
corresponding numbers are 56.9%, 73.8% and 16.3%, 70.4% and 12.8%, 38.3% and 
33.3%, 85%, respectively. 
The data about the share of firms that changed their exporting status more than 
once also provide useful information about export participation variability. For the 
Croatia, BIH, FRY Macedonia and Russia the numbers for longer time period are 
50%, 46.3%, 48.8% 40% and 41%,  respectively, while corresponding numbers for 
short time period are 25%, 29.3%, 37.8% 60% and 15%, respectively.  
 
 
2.2.3. Description of the variables 
 
Since the long time sample contains less data than the short time sample our 
analysis will be mainly based on the later sample. The data in table 1 show, that firms 
that contain also information about their credit rating
9 are bigger and more export 
oriented compared to firms in the full short time period sample. This is not surprising 
since one of the main activities of the banks is financing export activities of the firms. 
Since we will use the credit rating information only in the last part of our analysis, the 
below description of variables corresponds to the full short time period sample (1996-
2001). 
  The average firm has 544 employees, its coefficient of sales in fixed assets is 
2.07. The average firm makes 59.7% of all revenues makes in domestic (Slovene) 
market. The share of labor costs in value added
10 is 71%, the share of short-term 
liabilities in total liabilities and shareholder's equity is 30%. 
  In graph 1 and 2 w e show average value of revenues (only for firms that 
export to given market is positive) by years. As evident from graphs, average 
revenues are highest for Slovene market, as it is to be expected, whereas the export 
revenues are highest for the EU markets. Average revenues in EU grew for the whole 
period. The increase in the revenues is 37%. Russia exhibits great variability of the 
export revenues, where the whole period is marked by a significant decline in 1999. 
                                                                 
9 Credit rating information of firms were provided by Nova Ljubljanska Bank. 
10 We have calculated value added as labor costs plus amortization plus (minus) profit (loss). The fall of revenues in 1999 coincides with the Russian crisis. As a consequence, the 
real revenues in year 2001 are smaller than in year 1996. Revenues in countries of the 
former Yugoslavia exhibit high growth rates for the whole period, which is a natural 
consequence of political stabilization after 1996. The highest increase in revenues (in 
relative terms) is present for the BIH. Interestingly in year 2001 average revenues of 
companies exporting to the BIH surpass average revenues of companies exporting to 
the Croatia. However average exporting revenues to the Croatia are very stable. Also 
number of Slovene firms exporting to Croatia is bigger as  to BIH. Hence the Croatia 
is the most important market from the region of the former Yugoslavia.   Also the 
average value of exports to FRY is always increasing in observed period.. The only 
region with decline of export revenues in a given year is Macedonia, in period 2000-
2001. Fall in revenues coincides with increased political tension in this same period.  
  The labor costs remain between years 1996 and 2000 mainly  constant. They 
have increased in year 2001. As a result the labor costs increase in observed period 
only by 2%. Also the fixed assets basically do not exhibit any positive trend. The 
decline of fixed assets in years 1996 and 1997 is followed by the growth. The only 
variable that exhibits permanent decline is the average number of employees. In 
observed period the employment decreased by 9%.  
  Looking at the variables that measure the ownership structure we see that the 
share of the  insiders (workers, managers, former employees) has declined from 
38.73% in year 1996 to 25.32% in year 2001. There was also a decline in share of the 
investment and government funds from 38.88% in year 1996 to 31.79% in year 2001. 
On the other side, the power of small shareholders and other firms have increased. 
The ownership  share of  other firms increased from 9.29% to 28.68% and the 
ownership share of small shareholders increased from 13.69% to 14.37%. The 
increase of the ownership share of other firms is a result of takeovers, while the 
increase of the mall shareholders can be explained by an open market operations on 
the stock exchange. The average share of the nternal members of supervisory boards 
is declining over the whole period (54.93% in year 1996,  44.70% in year 2001). 
The average share of top executives in all employees  has increased from 
2.42% in year 1996 to 2.66% in year 2001. In the same period the share of managers 
with seventh or higher level education have increased from 61.25% to 71.46%.  On 
the other side, the share of replaced managers that was around 6% at the beginning of 
period reached its peak at 9.22% in year 1997 and then declined substantially in years 2001 and 2001 (to around 1%). It seems that after privatization most of the firms 
changed their managers. After that, the process of replacement settled down. The 
average age of chief executive is 50 years and on this position is on average already 9 
years.  
 
2.3. Econometric results 
 
2.3.1 A reduced form equation 
 
Deriving from the model, we can represent firm's presence in a given export 
market (Yit) as a function of company’s previous exporting history (sunk costs), 
company heterogeneity or observable firm differences and changes in export 
conditions. 
The effect of sunk cost is summarized by variables  1 , ? t i Y ,  1 , 2 , / ? ? t i t i Y Y .  1 , ? t i Y  is a 
binary variable that takes value 1 if the company was present in a given export market 
in thw last year and 0 if it was not. Similarly  1 , 2 , / ? ? t i t i Y Y measures the effect of a 
lagged firm's presence, but only if a company was absent from the time that the firm 
was last present two years. If it takes value 1, the firm was not present in the last year 
but two years ago, and 0 otherwise. We expect positive dependence, due to smaller 
asymmetry of information of previously present firms and better recognition of firm 
and their products because of previous participation, between both coefficients that 
summarize the effects of sunk costs and current market participation Yit.  
Variable pp90 measures to what extent the firm's current presence is 
determined (affected) by the firm's exporting status before the breakup. Therefore, 
this variable could also be an indirect measure of the effect of sunk costs. We expect  
the coefficient that measure the effect of pp90 to be positive.  
For measuring observable firm differences we included the following 
variables: number of employees in previous year laborl (proxy for firm size), lagged 
wages wl, firm's legal status dd (binary variable that takes value 1 if it is a joint-stock 
company and 0 if it is a limited liability company), LS2 (the percentage of a given 
firm’s shares that are owned by the state and investment funds), LS3 (share of other companies), LS4 (miscellaneous owners)
11, structure of supervisory board NS2 (share 
of internal owners in supervisory board) and various variables that measure 
management characteristics ( e11  measures share of managers in total number of 
employees,  e13  share of managers with educational level VII or higher,  e4m 
percentage share of replaced managers, e51 general managers' age, e52 working years 
as a general manager), type of industry I1 (beverages and food industry served as a 
basis). To isolate the effects of yearly variations in the business environment (e.g. 
exchange rate
12, relative prices, trade agreements, political situation..) we included 
yearly dummies Dy).  
   The reduced function to be estimated is the following: 
 
[12] 
Yi,t
 = ?( Y i,t? 1, Yi,t? 2, pp90, lnlabor1, lnw1, e11, e13, e4, e51, e52, LS2, LS3, LS4, NS2, dd, Ip,DY) 
 
   +       +          +             +         +       +     +     -       +    +      +        +          +      + 
 
The signs below the equation indicate the expected relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables. As mentioned earlier we expect past presence to 
have a positive effect on current market participation. We also expect that larger 
companies will find it easier to do business abroad and be more competitive due to 
economies of scale. Similarly we expect that companies that pay higher wages are 
more competitive in outside markets. It is more likely that a company will be present 
if it has an experienced manager and well educated management team (Domadenik et. 
al., 2000, Prašnikar et. al., 2002). Regarding joint stock companies, we expect that to 
have a positive effect on companies presence on a given export market. the same 
applies for companies with a higher share of outside owners and a higher share of 
outside members in the supervisory board (Frydman et. al., 1999, Murrell and 
                                                                 
11 The miscellaneous owner category does not include the percentage of shares owned by insiders 
(workers, managers and retired workers, LS1) because this share of ownership is treated as the base, 
captured in the regression constant, against which the effects of other forms of ownership are being 
estimated. 
12 The exchange rate is not explicitly included in our model. This is a consequence of two factors. 
Firstly, inclusion of yearly dummies excludes inclusion of exchange rate due to co-linearity. Due to the 
fact that political tensions are more significant for countries under observation we decided to include 
yearly dummies that better describe this effects. Secondly, export decisions of companies depend on 
export prices that are not in one-to-one correspondence with exchange rate (i.e. depend also on other 
factors). The effects of relative prices are to some extent taken into account with the inclusion of 
industry dummies and yearly dummies.   Djankov 2001, Prašnikar and Gregoric, 2002). For other variables, predicted signs are 
difficult to determine. 
 
2.3.2. Empirical Results 
 
Estimation of the participation equation (12) is given in tables 4 and 5. They 
are based on pooled probit estimation
13. The reported standard errors (given in 
parentheses) are based on White (1982) method. Due to the missing variables in 
longer time period sample, results in table 5 only complement results in table 4 with 
shorter time period sample.  
The effect of past exporting experience on current exporting status is 
summarized by values in first three rows. Focusing first on the coefficient Y t-1, we 
find that the last year’s exporting status has a strong positive effect on probability of 
exporting in current year. As expected the probability that a company exports in 
current year if it last exported two years ago is lower but still significant. Using 
Wald's test, we can reject the hypothesis that both coefficients are jointly equal to 
zero. The effect of past experience on entry cost deteriorates with time
14 for all areas 
except for EU, where due to lack of data, variable Y t-2/ Y t-1 was not included. As 
mentioned earlier companies did not step down from EU market after 1996.       
In most equations (except Russia) coefficient on pp90 is positive and 
significant, which indicates that presence in the markets before 1990 significantly 
affects the probability of exporting in the current period.  The coefficient on pp90 is 
also significant in the longer period (1992-2001). Although the values of coefficient 
                                                                 
13 Under the assumption that error term  (?it) is normally distributed, the equation (11) can be estimated 
with pooled probit model (Greene, 2002). However in our case a more reasonable assumption is that 
the error term ( ?it) is the sum of permanent, plant specific component,? I, and residual,  ? it (i.e. 
companies differ in their inclination towards export markets). This leads to inconsistency of parameters 
when using simple estimation technique regardless on the assumption made about behavior of  ? it 
(independently distributed or serially correlated). The consistency of parameter estimation in dynamic 
non-linear models with unobserved heterogeneity depends heavily on specification of initial conditions. 
Solving this problem is far more difficult in non-linear models then in linear models since there doesn’t 
exist a general transformation that would eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and lead into useful 
moment conditions. The above problem can be solved with  Heckman  (1981a, 1981b) and/or 
Wooldridge (2000) approach. In table A1 we compare results of pooled probit and Wooldridge 
approach.(We ignore the sunk cost connected with the variable pp90). Results show that sunk costs are 
still important when properly controlling (by Wooldridge approach) the structure of error term. 
However as expected, the marginal effects are smaller (but still positive) as in pooled probit 
estimations. 
 
14 Exporting experience for more than two years was not included due to small numbers of examples of 
companies that returned to the market after more then two years' absence. on pp90 are still significant when it comes to states of former Yugoslavia and Russia, 
they are considerably smaller then in the case of EU markets.  The EU markets stand 
out as the most important markets for Slovenian companies. Once the company enters 
into EU market it rarely ever exits. It is hard to determine whether this is consequence 
of very large sunk cost of entry and exit or a consequence of some other factor due to 
small variability of  export presence in the sample. It is, therefore, possible that 
companies persist in the EU markets despite unsatisfactory results (distressed 
exports)
15.    
The next group of coefficients summarizes the effects of specific company 
characteristics on export participation. Size of company matters when it comes to 
markets of Russia and FRY (both short and long term sample). It matters also in the 
market of BIH if we only look at the results of longer time period 1992-2001. It seems 
that these markets are more risky and that larger companies diversify risk easier. As 
mentioned earlier, the number of variables that are included in the model is different 
for short and long samples. Therefore, it may happen that the results on coefficients of 
variables differ among long and short sample. For example, when we include into our 
model of export participation on markets of EU variable legal status of company, the 
sign of the coefficient on size changes from positive and nearly significant to negative 
and significant. It seems that the change in sign of coefficient is connected to the 
entrance of smaller companies (mainly limited liability companies). Most of these 
companies were formed after 1990, due to breakup of larger companies and takeovers. 
These smaller companies are oriented mainly to EU markets and are thus more 
affected by crisis on these markets than large companies.  
The ownership variables and the structure of supervisory board do not seem to 
influence companies export participation (the exception is EU market where external 
ownership is more important than internal one). The results also show that motivation 
of employees is not an important factor in explaining export participation. It also 
seems that no type of industry is more present in exports markets, except for 
companies forming fifth group (miscellaneous). The sign of industry dummy for that 
group is negative for all markets, however it is significant only for markets of EU, 
BIH and Croatia.  
 
                                                                 
15 We test the effect of export participation on company's financial stability in following section  
We expected that management characteristics would play a more significant 
role in explaining export participation.variable. The variable e13 (share of managers 
with educational level VII or higher) is positive and significant in the market of BIH. 
The variable e4m (percentage share of replaced managers) is positive and significant 
for the markets of EU and negative and significant in Russian market.   The 
coefficient of variable  e52 ( working years as a general manager) is positive and 
significant in EU market  
If we focus on the impact of changes in business environment on export 
participation, following conclusions can be drawn.  Some of the variables that were 
included in analysis of shorter sample were not included due to lack of data in the 
longer sample (1992-2001). This is the main reason why the results of the coefficients 
on time dummies in longer and shorter sample should be treated differently, since 
obviously due to smaller number of variables in longer sample time dummies will 
represents other events besides changes in business environment (e.g. appearance of 
limited liability companies after privatization in 1996). Values of coefficients of time 
dummies in shorter sample indicate the start of the recession in 2001 on EU markets, 
while in the longer sample the values of the time dummies coefficients don not 
indicate such a crisis. Although we should be careful in explaining signs of the 
coefficients on the time dummies in the longer sample, they correctly indicate the 
presence of the crisis in former Yugoslavia in beginning of 90.   
   Besides recession in 2001 in EU markets, other important changes in business 
environment can be noted. Results of probit analysis on shorter sample for Russia, 
FRY and Macedonia are especially indicative. The probability that a company is 
present on Russian market is significantly lower in 1997 compared to 2001. This 
coincides with Russian crisis that began later that year and peaked in 1998 (the 
coefficient on time dummy 98 is also negative but insignificant). Similarly for the 
FRY, negative and significant values on dummies 97 and 99 indicate well-known 
events that took place in that period (value of coefficient on dummy 98 is also 
negative and almost significant). Due to the high risks linked to political turmoil that 
reached its peak in 1999, Slovenian companies found this market to be unattractive. In 
contrast to the FRY, the value of the coefficient on the time dummy 1999 is positive 
and significant for the Macedonian market. Due to the military intervention, 
Slovenian companies exported to FRY from Macedonia.    
2.4. Conclusion 
 
We can conclude that hysteresis is an important factor in explaining the export 
participation of Slovene firms. This is especially true for the EU markets. The results 
also show that the variables that measure heterogeneity of firms are not very 
important in explaining export participation of Slovene firms. Macroeconomic and 
political stability of former Yugoslav countries and Russia are very important in 
explaining export dynamics of Slovene firms. Probably these markets are very risky 
and firms' behavior accounts for that fact. The nice example is Croatia. Besides EU 
markets,  this market was for Slovene firms the most stable one. Most of our firms 
were present in Croatia already before 1991. However the average export to Croatia  
does not increase over "safe" level. It seems, that due to high risk firms form a kind of 
"security" limit.   
 
 
3. Export to EU and the financial success 
 
3.1. Exit costs as a reason for persistence of Slovene firms in EU markets 
 
In the previous  section we have shown that the markets of EU are the main 
exporting markets for Slovene firms. When a firm enters into that markets usually 
does not exit. Besides the entry costs, the key role play also the  exit costs. Exist costs 
consist of the switching costs (costs of replacing stable buyers with new ones) and the 
costs of reducing the production (compensation money for excess workers) when firm 
is not able to replace old customers with new ones. Firms that are heavily dependent 
from sales in EU markets, where the competition is severe and the possibility of 
charging the price above marginal cost is small, remain in the EU markets despite the 
fact, that they hardly cover the variable costs. It is even possible, that occasionally the 
price falls below the variable costs but the firm does not exit from that market.. This is 
more likely to happen if the absorption power of the markets (growth rate of  EU 
markets) declines. Above is more likely to happen  for a firm that pursues the strategy 
of cost efficiency. Due to being small, Slovene firms have can not take the advantage of the economy of scale. If they operate in the  simple phase in a chain of the value 
added creation, their situation is even more severe.
16 Above description allows us to 
make the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The financial success of a firm is negatively related with the share of 
revenues that a firm makes in the EU markets. 
 
H2: The financial success of a firm is negatively related with the absorption 
power (growth rate) of the EU markets. 
 
H3: The financial success of the firm is smaller if the firm is operating in the  
simple phase in the  chain of a value added creation. 
 
All above hypothesis are related with the size of the exit costs. The exit costs of 
the firms that create most of its revenues in the EU markets are high due to high cost 
of replacing their customers. If the growth rate of EU markets decline and the firms 
are unable to find new, more profitable markets, they face problems, since they are 
confronted with  excess workers (compensation money). Similar problems face firms 
that are operating in the  simple phase in the chain of the value added creation. Hence 
the high exit costs increases probability that the firms remain in the EU markets 
despite the declines in prices and profits.  
  We will test above hypothesis in a similar manner as we have tested the 
existence of sunk cost in previous section. We can write the exit condition for a firm 
in a similar manner as entry condition that is given in (6). The only difference is that 
we replace entry cost with exit costs: 
 
[13]  it it it it it E Y Y ? ? ? ? ? ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ? ? . 
 
 
The firm remains in the exporting market as long as the expected loss (the 
difference between staying in the market Y=1 and exiting Y=0) in this market is 
smaller as the exit costs (E). 
                                                                 
16 For Slovene firms more suitable is the strategy of differentiated products and services and satisfying Based on above discussion, the exit costs from the EU markets can be written 
as:  
 
[14]  it
j
ij it t EUit it it I a w a g a s a V E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ( 4 3 2 1
? ?   
 
  
  where we have assumed that the exit costs are proportional to the size of the 
firm (V). The size of exit costs depends on the share of revenues created in the EU 
markets (sEU = revenues in EU/all revenues), growth rate of EU economy (g) and the 
share of labor costs in the value added (w). 
  Following the procedure in section 2.1. and using the fact that in reduced form 
equation the difference between being in a given market or not depends on 
macroeconomic factors, characteristics of the firm and on the error term, the equation 
(9) can be rewritten as: 
 
[15]  it
j
ij it t EUit it it t it it it it I a w a g a s a V Z Y Y ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( 4 3 2 1
? ? ? ?
.  
 
The variable  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ? ? ? it it it it Y Y ? ?  is not very suitable for an empirical 
implementation. However, since it is proportional to the current gross profit  it d  (look 
Appendix), it can be replace with: 
 
[16]   it it it it it d Y Y ? ? ? ? ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ? ?  
 
  This allows us to write (15) as: 
 
[17]  it
j
ij it t EUit it it t it I a w a g a s a V Z d ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ( 4 3 2 1
? ? ? ?
 
 
  If we divide both sides with the variable that captures the size of the firm, we 
get: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
market niches (Pucko, 2002). [18]   it
j
ij it t EUit it t
it
it I a w a g a s a Z
V
d
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ( 4 3 2 1
' ? ? ? ?
 
   
 
Described procedure is very general. The exact equation used in the empirical 
implementation is given in the next section. 
 
3.2  Estimation of the financial success equation 
 
  For an empirical implementation we write equation (18) as: 
 
[19]  B09fa = b0  +  b1 peuit  +  b2 absEUit  +  b3 peuabsEUit +  b4 dLCvVAit  
+  b5 e11it  +  b6 e13it+  b7 e4mit+ b8 e51it + b9 e52it + b10 LS2it + b11 
LS3it + b12 LS4it + b13 NS2it + b14 ddit + b15PANOGAi + ?it,. 
 
  where the independent variable (B09fa) is a cash flow (B06) divided by the 
fixed assets (fa).
17 The independent variables are share of sales in EU  (peu)
18, absEU 
measures the growth rate of the German economy, peuabsEU=absEU*peu and the 
variable DLCvVA, which  measures the labor costs in the value added. The variable 
e11 measures share of managers in total employment, e13 is the share of managers 
with educational level VII or higher, the variable  e4m is  the  share of replaced 
managers, e51 is the age of chief executive and the variable e52 measures how many 
year was the chief executive at this position. The variables LS2, LS3 and LS4 measure 
an ownership structure. The variable  LS2  measures an ownership share of the 
investment and government funds, LS3 measures an ownership share of the other 
firms and LS4 is the ownership share of other owners. The LS4 does not include the 
inside owners (workers, mangers, former employees). The inside owners serve 
namely as a base (LS1). The variable NS2 measures the share of external members in 
supervisory board, while dd is a dummy variable that has a value 1 if the firm is a 
joint stock company.  
                                                                 
17 The fixed assets serve as a proxy for the size of the firm. One reason for taking the fixed assets 
instead of revenues is that it eliminates the influence of cyclicality of an economy. However, there is 
also another reason. The variable B09fa is also an important from the lender (bank) view.  Namely, 
bank is using this variable to determine the credit rating of a firm. More detailed discussion is given in 
section 3.3.   Equation (19) contains following key hypothesis about the financial success of  
firms: 
 
H1: The financial success of the firm is negatively related with the share of 
revenues that a firm makes in the EU markets (b1 ? 0) 
H2: The financial success of the firm is negatively related with the growth rate 
of  the EU markets (b2 ? 0 & b3 ? 0). 
H3: The financial success of the firm is negatively related with the share of 
labor costs in value added (b4 < 0). 
H4: The financial success of the firm that has higher share of mangers in total 
employment is 
  a) higher as in firms with a smaller share of mangers (b5 ? 0) or 
  b) equal (b5 = 0). 
H5: The financial success of the firm that has higher share of mangers with 
educational level VII or higher is 
  a) higher as in firms with a smaller share of mangers (b6 ? 0) or 
  b) equal (b6 = 0). 
H6: The financial success of the firm that has a higher share of the replaced 
managers is 
  a) smaller  as in firms with a smaller share of replaced  mangers (b7 < 0) or 
  b) equal (b7 = 0). 
H7: The financial success of the firm that general managers are older is 
  a) higher as in firms that have younger general manager (b8 ? 0) or 
  b) equal (b8 = 0). 
H8: The financial success of the firm whose general managers has been in this 
position for a long time is   
  a) higher as in firms with "short time" general manager  (b9 ? 0) or 
  b) equal (b9 = 0). 
H9: The financial success of the firm that has a bigger share of outside owners 
is compared to firms with inside ownership  
   a) higher (b10 ? 0 and/or  b11 ? 0 and/or b12? 0  ) or 
  b) equal (b10 = 0). 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
18 Germany is the most importing market for Slovene economy.  H10: The financial success of the firm that has a  bigger share of external 
supervisors is 
  a) higher as in firms with higer share of internal supervisors  (b13 ? 0) or 
  b) equal (b13 = 0). 
H11: The financial success of the joint stock companies is  
   a) higher(b14 ? 0) or 
  b) equal (b14 = 0). 
 
  The table 6 contains the results of the equation (19).  The results support the 
hypothesis H1-H3. The coefficient b1 is positive and  statistically significant. Hence 
there is negative relationship between financial success of the firm and the share of 
exports to EU. Variable absEU is not statistically significant. However variable 
peuabsEU has the correct sign (b3? 0) and is also statistically significant.  The share 
of labor costs in value added has a negative impact on B09fa (b4? 0) but is not 
statistically significant. 
Among the variables that measure the influence of managers on financial 
success of the firm, the variable e4m is negative and very statistically significant.  
Higher the share of replaced managers, less successful the firm is. The coefficient of 
variable e11 (share of managers in total employment) is also negative and statistically 
significant at 10% level. This could imply that to many  managers could lead to 
managerial slack. Other variables that measure influence on managers  are not 
statistically significant.  
Hypothesis H9a is not supported by our data. Also we do not find support for  
hypothesis H10a and H11a. 
  We can conclude that exit costs are an important factor  for explaining the 
persistence of Slovene firms in the EU markets. If the firm is heavily focused on EU 
markets, it has a higher exit costs (cost of replacement). Hence, the firm does not exit 
from the EU markets even if this worsens their financial position. This is especially 
true in case of  the decline of absorption power in the EU markets. 
 
 
 
 3.3. Expected solvency of firms  
 
We have shown that due to high exit costs Slovene firms do not exit from EU 
markets even if this worsens their financial position and leads to losses. On long range 
this policy would lead to the bankruptcy.  However, on short range the firm can 
overcome above problem with incurring debts. The firm can take loans form their 
suppliers,
19 banks or on a black market. Taking loans form suppliers is connected with 
the interest of suppliers that their merchandise is "sold". However sooner or later the 
bills are paid with such delay or are unpaid that suppliers are not willing to sell their 
products any more. Since it is currently almost impossible for unsuccessful firms to 
get loans in black market,  the loans from banks are of vital importance.  
  Bank of Slovenia requires from banks that they monitor and estimate credit 
risks that they face very carefully at pursuing their activities. As a results banks rank 
their customers and their claims into five groups A -E. Group A consist of bank 
customers (firms), for which is expected that they will not have problems with 
repaying loans. In group B are firms that are currently in a weak financial position  
and often repay loans with delay. In group C are firms that do not have enough long 
term resources for financing investments. Also banks do not get  from them enough 
information and adequate documentation about their debts. Group D consists of firms 
that are not liquid or are insolvent. It is likely that such firms will not be able to repay 
loans. In group E are firms that are not able to pay their obligations. Hence banks are 
ranking firms according to their expected solvency. Firms with the credit rating A and 
B are "normal" customers, while with firms in group C or lower, banks transact only 
in special occasions.  
  We have tested the hypothesis of persistence of Slovene firms in EU markets 
due to high exit costs  also with the expected solvency of the firms, which is based on 
the credit rating information.  
  Out of a full sample of 155 firms in a period 1996-2001, we were able to 
obtain for 112 firms their credit rating information. The quarterly credit rating 
information were collected from the Nova Ljubljanska Bank.
20 In the analysis we 
have use the credit rating information on 1st of April of current year. The credit rating 
                                                                 
19 Taking loans from suppliers and not paying the bills is the common strategy used by Slovene firms. 
This is especially true for the firms which have adequate market power (Prašnikar et. al., 2002) 
20 Only 112 firms gave us the permission to collect their credit rating from the Nova Ljubljanska Bank. was used as dependent variable. To firms with credit rating A we assigned value 2, to 
firms with credit rating B value 1 was assigned, to other firms we assigned value 0. 
Independent variables  are the cash flow in fixed assets (B09fa), the share of short 
range liabilites in total liabilites and shareholder's equity liabilites (D32v36) and the 
firm characteristic variables ( variables that measure managers influence: e11, e13, 
e4m, e51 and e52; variables that measure ownership structure and structure of the 
supervisory board: LS2, LS3, LS4 NS2;  variable that measure legal  status (dd) and 
industry dummies).The variable pure cash flow reflects the most general measure of 
credit ranking of the firms. It reflects the ability of firms to repay their obligations. 
We have normalized the variable cash flow with fixed assets since the banks generally 
tie up the ability to repay loans with the size of mortgage insurance that is linked with 
the value of fixed assets.  The variable D32v36 reflects the short-term indebtedness of 
a firm that is usually used as an alternative measure for rating of firms. 
  We have estimated the relationship between credit rating and independent 
variables with random effect ordered probit model.
21The estimator takes into account: 
(1) that dependent variable has an ordinal meaning. In our case the variable credit 
rating takes values 0,1 and 2. The firms with the highest credit rating (A) have value 
2, firms with credit rating B have value 1 and for the other firms the value of credit 
rating is 0. The fact that value 2 reflects the higher credit rating as value 1 contains 
useful information despite the fact that the variable credit rating has only ordinal 
meaning; (2) the panel structure of the data, where the error term (?it) is the sum of the 
plant specific component ( ? i) and the residual ( ?it ). The results of the expected 
solvency of the firms are given in table 7.  
  From table 7 we can see that the coefficient of the cash flow in fixed assets 
(B09fa) has a positive sign and is highly statistically significant. The firms with higher 
value of cash flow in fixed assets have on average higher credit rating. The coefficient 
of short term obligations in total liabilities and shareholder's equity ( D32v36)  is 
negative and also highly significant. The firms with higher value of the variable 
D32v36 have lower credit rating.  Hence both variables have expected signs. For 
firms that makes most of their revenues in EU at a declining cash flow, is expected 
that their solvency will decrease. With the decrease in credit  rating, firms  ability  to 
get bank loans will decrease and/or they will be able to get loans under much stricter conditions. This will be true even more in the case that the growth rate of E U 
economy will decline. Also the firms that are more indebted will have bigger 
problems with getting  the loans.   
  Some manager variables and other variables that reflect the firm's 
heterogeneity are statistically significant which was not the case in estimation of 
equation (19). Some of the variables have even the reverse sign. We have to note 
again that the sample of 112 (out of 155) consists of the firms that that gave us the 
permission to use their credit rating information. As a result we do not pay to much 
attention to the signs of the variables that reflect the heterogeneity of the firm. They 
were include mainly because we wanted to  control for heterogeneity in estimating the 
expected solvency of the firms.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
To known distortions, that have roots in market failures in domestic markets 
(none-competitiveness of the none-tradable sector, the distortions in labor markets...) 
we add the specific behavior of Slovene firms in foreign markets. In comparison with 
their global competitors their economic power is very small. Their sales depends 
heavily on a small number of buyers (truncated firm). 
  When firm  enters in foreign market needs to cover the entry costs, which later 
on become sunk. As a result, the entry conditions are different as exit ones. Entry 
price that needs to cover both the operational and the sunk costs is in case of zero exit 
cost higher than the exit price that needs to cover only the operational costs. In case of 
none zero exit cost this price can even fall below the operational cost, while firms do 
not exit the market. 
We have shown that sunk costs are present in the export participation of 
Slovene firms. Our results also show that when the absorption power of the exporting 
market declines,  firms still trade with their established buyers (hysteresis) despite the 
fact that due to lower prices  their exporting revenues decline. However in case of the 
unexpected and long-term decline of the absorption power or in case of the 
unsatisfactory policy that would lead to reduction of competitiveness of the tradable 
sector, a huge number of firms would exit from foreign markets.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
21 More about random effect probit model can be found for example in Wooldridge (2002) or Green The results reveal that firms do not exit from EU markets, which are the most 
important exporting market for Slovene firms. We show that this can be explained 
with high exit costs, which consist of switching costs (costs of replacing stable buyers 
with new ones) and cost of reducing the production (compensation money for excess 
workers) and high re-entry cost if firms would later on again want  to replace more 
risky South-East European and Russian markets with EU markets.  
The results reveal that the firm that makes most of it revenues in EU, remains 
in that market despite the fact, that this worsens the financial position of it. The results 
show also that his is especially true in the case of a decline of absorption power in EU 
i.e. decline in the growth rate of the EU markets. The decline in demand leads to 
reduction in cash flow and in order to continue production, firms need to take loans. 
However indebtedness is limited. Banks namely give loans based on expected 
solvency that can be seen as the credit rating of firms. Our results confirm that credit 
rating is negatively related with the financial position of the firms. As a result, the 
negative external shock  could be devastating for the exporting part of Slovene 
economy. 
 
References 
 
?? Baldwin R. E.: Hysteresis in Import Prices - The Beachhead Effect, American 
Economic Review, September 1988, 78 (4) 
 
?? Baldwin R. E. and Krugman P. R.: Persistent Trade Effects of Large Exchange 
Rate Shocks. Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1989,104 (4) 
 
?? Baltagi B.: Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Willey & Sons, 1995. 
 
?? Bole V.: Denarna politika v casu odštevanja, Gospodarska gibanja¸št. 346, 
2003. 
 
?? Bole V.: Ekonomsko prestrukturiranje, Gospodarska gibanja, št. 239, 1993. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
(2000). ?? Campa J. M.: Entry by Foreign Firms in the United States Under Exchange 
Rate Uncertainty, Review of Economics and Statistics, november 1993, 75 (4). 
 
?? Chamberlain G.: Comment: Sequential Moment Restrictions in Panel Data, 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 10, 1992. 
 
?? Chay K. in Hyslop D.: Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Binary 
Response Panel Data Models: Empirical Evidence using Alternative 
Approaches, mimeo, 2000. 
 
?? Cheung Y., Chinn M., and Fujii E.: Market Structure and the Persistence of 
Sectoral Real Exchange Rates, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1999.  
 
?? Chinn M. and Johnston L.: The Impact of Productivity Differentials on real 
Exchange Rates: Beyond the Balassa-Samuelson Framework, University of 
California, Santa Cruz, 1999.   
 
?? Das S., Roberts M. J. in Tybout J. R.: Market Entry Costs, Producer 
Heterogeneity and Export Dynamics, NBER Working paper, December 2001. 
 
?? Debeljak Ž., Prašnikar J. in Ahcan A.: Benchmarking kot orodje strateškega 
managementa, v J. Prašnikar:  Primerjajmo se z najboljšimi, Finance, 2002. 
 
?? Dixit A.: Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty, Journal of Political 
Economy, June 1989a, 97 (3). 
 
?? Djankov S., Murrell P.:  Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: Quantitative 
Survey.  First Draft. 
 
?? Domadenik, P., Prašnikar J. and Svejnar J.: Restructuring Slovenian Firms in 
Imperfectly Developed Markets (paper presented at WDI and CEPR 
Conference on Economics of Transition, Portoroz), June, 2001. 
 ?? Feinberg R. M.: Hysteresis and Export Targeting, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, December 1992, 10 (4). 
?? Frdyman R., Gray C., Hessel M., Rapacyinski A.: When Does Privatisation 
work? The Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in the 
Transition Economies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (4). 
?? Green, W.H.: Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall. New Jersey, 2000. 
 
?? Greene W.: Convenient Estimators for the Panel Probit Model, mimeo, 2002. 
 
?? Heckman, J.: Statistical Models for Discrete Panel Data, 3 poglavje v Manski 
C. in  McFadden D.  (eds.), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data, MIT Press, 
1981a. 
 
?? Heckman J.: The Incidental Parameters Problem and the Problem of Initial 
Conditions in Estimating a Discrete Time-Discrete Data Stochastic Process, 4. 
poglavje v  Manski C. in McFadden D. (eds.), Structural Analysis of Discrete 
Data, MIT Press, 1981a. 
 
?? Heckman J.: Heterogeneity and State Dependence, v Rosen S. (ed.), Studies in 
Labor Markets, University of Chicago Press, 1981c. 
 
?? Honore B.: Orthogonality Conditions for Tobit Models with Fixed Effects and 
Lagged Dependent Variables, Journal of Econometrics 59, 1993. 
 
?? Honore B. in Kyriazidou E.: Panel Data Discrete Choice Models with Lagged 
Dependent Variables, Econometrica 68, 2000. 
 
?? Hsiao C.: Analysis of Panel Data, Cambridge University Press,  1986. 
 
? ?Prašnikar J., Gregoric A.:  The Influence of Workers’ Participation on the 
Power of Management in Transitional Countries. The Case of Slovenia, 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 73, No. 2, 2002. 
 ? ?Prašnikar J, Bartlett W, Domadenik P, Markovska V. The Productivity 
Analyses of Slovenian and Macedonian Firms. Phare ACE paper, 2002 
 
?? Prašnikar J, Pahor M., Cirman A.: Placilna nedisciplina slovenskih podjetij in 
primerjava s podjetji  v drugih državah, v j. Prašnikar: Primerjajmo se z 
najboljšimi, Finance, 2002. 
 
?? Pucko D.: Analiza konkurencnih prednosti slovenskih podjetij, v. J. Prašnikar: 
Primerjajmo se z najboljšimi, Finance, 2002. 
 
?? Roberts M. J. in Tybout J. R:  The Decision to Export in Colombia - An 
Empirical Model of Entry With Sunk Cost, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 87, No. 4, 1997. 
 
?? Snaith B, Walker J.: The »Theory of Medium Enterprise«, International 
Conference of Medium Enterprise Development, July 2002.  
 
?? Sunk Cost Hysteresis, National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge 
MA), Working Paper No. 2911, 1989.   
 
?? Wooldridge J.: Multiplicative Panel Data Models without the Strict 
Exogeneity Assumption, Econometric Theory 13, 1997. 
 
?? Wooldridge J.: The Initial Conditions Problem in Dynamic, Nonlinear Panel 
Data Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity, mimeo, 2000. 
 
?? Wooldridge, J.M.: Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002. 
 
?? White H .: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models, 
Econometrica, 50, 1982.  
 Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  N  1992-2001  N 
1996-2001 
(all sample)  N 
1996-2001 
(with credit 
rating) 
Description 
RE  1806      8188284 
(1.66e+07)  1001  8810353 
(1.88e+07)  438  9017324 
(1.53e+07)  Revenues  
RESlo  1451  5215504 
(1.51e+07) 
870    5256943 
(1.62e+07) 
429  3485752  
(8238574) 
     - Slovenia (SLO 
Reeu  1448  1976935  
(5420480) 
870  2257148 
(6363765) 
429    3228269  
(8547197) 
     - EU 
Reru    1438    207997 
 (1127537)  866  221710,6 
(1155786)  430  283950,4  
(1223145)       - Russia (RU 
Recro  1411      421276,9 
(1261911)  860    422607,5 
(1299013)  420  493023,1 
(1449898)        - Croatia (CRO) 
Rebih  1424  183476,3 
(949903,8)  868  233071,3 
(1162686)  422  202176,7 
(605374.5)        - BIH 
Refry  1401    100727,5  
(576200,5) 
854  61163,13 
(258130,9) 
417  94809,55 
(349002,3) 
       - FRY. 
Remac  1418  91846,3 
(353819,4) 
864    91348,67  
(338699,2 ) 
423  134768,3 
(421365,6 ) 
        - Macedonia (MAC) 
FA  /  /  1001  4219108  
(7487781)  438  4538606 
(7196262)  Fixed assets 
W  /  /  1031  2831,58 
(1026,23)  438  2994,572  
(1114,61)  Labor cost on employee 
Labor  /  /  998  544,7375 
(726,66)  438  604,5251 
(852,6073)  Number of employees 
VA      996     2304685 
(3850529) 
437  2714288 
(4322145) 
Value Added 
Ko  /  /  1001  2509332  
(5138870) 
438  2628499 
(4865101) 
Short term liabilities 
Ovs  /  /  1001  9121413 
(1.72e+07)  438  1.04e+07 
(1.80e+07) 
Total liabilities and 
shareholder's equity 
Peu  1619  27,92   
(30,25)  888  29,73408 
(30,92)  429  34,82 
(31,13)  Share of revenues in EU 
DLCvVA  /  /  995  0,80 
(0,86)  437  0,73 
(0,62) 
Share of labor costs in value 
added 
D32v36  /  /  1001  0,29 
(0,17)  438  0,27 
(0,16)  Ko / Ovs 
B06  /  /  973  693223  
(1931843) 
438  949222,6  
(2302535) 
Cash flow 
B09  /  /  973  0,04 
(0,23)  438  0,07 
(0,22) 
Cash flow in revenues 
(B06/RE) 
B09fa  /  /  972  0,12 
(0,24)  438  0,18 
(0,25)  B06/FA 
LS1  /  /  821  31,56 
(24,89)  528  31,93 
(25,13)  Share of inside owners 
LS2  /  /  824  32,15 
(23,77)  531  34,38 
(24,50) 
Share of investment and 
government funds 
LS3  /  /  824  23,25 
(34,35) 
531  21,17 
(31,82) 
Share of other firms and 
banks 
LS4  /  /  818  13,06 
(19,56)  525  12,55 
(18,76  Share of other owners 
NS1  /  /  755  50,72 
(19,90)  470  50,27 
(19,11) 
Share of inside members of 
supervisory board 
e11  /  /  828  2,56  
(2,07)  438  2,61 
(2,04)  Number of mangers/Labor 
e4m  /  /  759  8,90 
(17,87)  438  8,53 
(17,15)  Share of replaced mangers 
e13  /  /  840    63,16  
(29,99) 
438  65,97 
(29,77) 
Share of managers with VII 
or higher education level 
e51  /  /  1064  49,62  
(8,43)  438  50,10 
(8,48)  Age of general manager 
e52  /  /  1064  8,45 
(6,23)  438  8,25 
(5,93) 
Number of years in the 
position of general manager 
 Table 2: Number of Firms that Entered to Different Exporting Markets 
 
LETA EU RU HRV BIH ZRJ MAK
1990 5 5 2 2 3 1
1991 8 2 8 7 4 8
1992 12 3 8 1 4 1
1993 7 6 11 6 3
LETA EU RU CRO BIH FRY MAC
1990 5 5 2 2 3 1
1991 8 2 8 7 4 8
1992 12 3 8 1 4 1
1993 7 6 11 6 3 9
1994 5 2 9 13 1 6
1995 4 1 8 9 5 8
1996 7 5 13 22 19 12
1997 4 5 8 11 9 6
1998 2 2 3 4 3
9
1994 5 2 9 13 1 6
1995 4 1 8 9 5 8
1996 7 5 13 22 19 12
1997 4 5 8 11 9 6
1998 2 2 3 4 3 3
1999 5 5 7 9 7 10
2000 5 3 5 8 12 4
2001 0 7 3 3 14 1  Table 3: Number of Firms that Exited from Different Exporting Markets 
 
 
LETA EU RU HRV BIH ZRJ MAK
1990 0 3 1 6 9 3
1991 1 4 8 6 15 2
1992 1 0 8 15 13 7
1993 0 0 1 11 9
LETA EU RU CRO BIH FRY MAC
1990 0 3 1 6 9 3
1991 1 4 8 6 15 2
1992 1 0 8 15 13 7
1993 0 0 1 11 9 3
1994 1 3 6 0 2 1
1995 0 0 3 2 2 1
1996 0 3 1 2 1 1
1997 0 1 1 1 10 2
1998 2 1 3 3 1
3
1994 1 3 6 0 2 1
1995 0 0 3 2 2 1
1996 0 3 1 2 1 1
1997 0 1 1 1 10 2
1998 2 1 3 3 1 3
1999 1 4 1 1 4 2
2000 1 0 1 4 3 6
2001 0 3 1 1 5 7  
 Table 4: Results of Pooled Probit Analysis for the period 1996-2001 
  EU  Rusija  Hrvaška  BiH  ZRJ  Makedonija 
Yt-1  6,054*  3,721*  3,485*  3,156*  2,466*  3,292* 
  (1,253)  (0,346)  (0,266)  (0,231)  (0,205)  (0,267) 
Yt-2/Y t-1=0    1,730*  1,779*  1,393*  0,852*  1,538* 
    (0,554)  (0,459)  (0,683)  (0,327)  (0,440) 
pp90  3,805*  0,285  0,537*  0,678*  0,874*  0,794* 
  (1,505)  (0,271)  (0,221)  (0,202)  (0,262)  (0,242) 
 E11  0,159  -0,008  0,039  -0,091  3,476  0,002 
  (0,120)  (0,068)  (0,063)  (0,056)  (5,196)  (0,075) 
E13  0,007  -0,003  -0,001  0,007*  -0,004  0,001 
  (0,008)  (0,003)  (0,004)  (0,003)  (0,003)  (0,004) 
e4m  0,018  -0,015*  0,002  -0,003  -0,005  0,010 
  (0,011)  (0,007)  (0,005)  (0,006)  (0,005)  (0,005) 
E51  -0,030  0,020  -0,024  0,024  0,014  0,005 
  (0,042)  (0,015)  (0,021)  (0,019)  (0,012)  (0,013) 
E52  0,140*  -0,039  0,052*  0,001  0,005  -0,007 
  (0,061)  (0,027)  (0,025)  (0,018)  (0,016)  (0,021) 
NS2  0,001  0,004  -0,006  -0,009  0,000  0,005 
  (0,010)  (0,009)  (0,005)  (0,005)  (0,006)  (0,006) 
LS2  0,102*  0,003  0,021*  0,014*  0,012  0,012 
  (0,033)  (0,009)  (0,010)  (0,007)  (0,008)  (0,007) 
LS3  0,079*  -0,012  0,018*  0,010  0,004  -0,002 
  (0,025)  (0,008)  (0,009)  (0,006)  (0,007)  (0,008) 
LS4  0,067*  0,017  0,011  0,016*  0,000  0,005 
  (0,028)  (0,009)  (0,010)  (0,007)  (0,007)  (0,006) 
_Ipanoga_2  -0,951  0,858*  1,191*  -0,167  -0,062  0,049 
  (0,707)  (0,336)  (0,569)  (0,311)  (0,295)  (0,244) 
_Ipanoga_3  -0,054  0,709*  -0,107  -0,447  0,131  -0,023 
  (1,023)  (0,298)  (0,382)  (0,252)  (0,214)  (0,283) 
_Ipanoga_4  -1,972*  //  -0,325  -0,423  -0,759  -0,284 
  (0,697)  //  (0,316)  (0,314)  (0,455)  (0,230) 
_Ipanoga_5  -2,931*  -0,069  -1,061*  -0,717*  -0,277  -1,489 
  (1,080)  (0,328)  (0,385)  (0,307)  (0,300)  (0,786) 
_Idd_1  -4,150*  -0,064  -0,735  -0,238  -0,657  -0,509 
  (1,473)  (0,681)  (0,604)  (0,415)  (0,544)  (0,614) 
lnlaborl  -1,054*  0,409*  0,163  -0,103  0,260*  -0,025 
  (0,491)  (0,180)  (0,139)  (0,136)  (0,117)  (0,146) 
Lnwl  -1,253  -0,094  -0,520  0,007  0,229  0,027 
  (0,751)  (0,228)  (0,486)  (0,238)  (0,173)  (0,171) 
DY96  2,799*  -0,714  0,350  0,601  -0,196  0,679* 
  (0,990)  (0,626)  (0,344)  (0,325)  (0,291)  (0,338) 
DY97  1,360*  -0,917*  0,373  0,347  -0,642*  0,424 
  (0,636)  (0,454)  (0,391)  (0,350)  (0,318)  (0,413) 
DY98  1,738*  -0,955  -0,089  -0,295  -0,522  0,026 
  (0,575)  (0,514)  (0,417)  (0,345)  (0,283)  (0,266) 
DY99  0,283  -0,307  0,094  0,506  -0,810*  0,780* 
  (0,690)  (0,421)  (0,365)  (0,317)  (0,276)  (0,333) 
DY100  1,557*  0,012  0,089  0,342  -0,390  0,053 
  (0,647)  (0,372)  (0,370)  (0,331)  (0,268)  (0,306) 
_cons  10,459  -4,459*  1,950  -2,676  -5,382*  -3,211* 
  (5,668)  (2,013)  (3,517)  (2,165)  (1,675)  (1,586) 
?
2** 
   119,9  172,8  188,1  145,1  153,4 
*Statisticaly significant at 5% level 
** Wald  test: both coefficient  Yt-1, Yt-2Yt -1 are jointly equal to 0. 
 
  
Table 5: Results of Pooled Probit Analysis for period 1992-2001 
  EU  RU  CRO  BiH  FRY  MAC 
Yt -1  4,136*  3,423*  3,335*  3,046*  2,488*  3,294* 
  (0,389)  (0,193)  (0,175)  (0,167)  (0,156)  (0,195) 
Yt-2/Y t-1=0  //  0,910*  1,465*  1,174*  0,480  1,637* 
  //  (0,451)  (0,322)  (0,326)  (0,249)  (0,354) 
Pp 90  1,123*  0,399*  0,663*  0,690*  1,004*  0,975* 
  (0,325)  (0,168)  (0,169)  (0,146)  (0,227)  (0,199) 
_Ipanoga_2  -0,245  0,224  0,757*  0,120  0,189  0,288 
  (0,328)  (0,218)  (0,288)  (0,201)  (0,207)  (0,186) 
_Ipanoga_3  0,006  0,249  -0,029  -0,096  0,131  -0,042 
  (0,412)  (0,201)  (0,214)  (0,170)  (0,154)  (0,191) 
_Ipanoga_4  -0,967*  //  -0,367  -0,331  -0,797*  -0,134 
  (0,233)  //  (0,219)  (0,217)  (0,358)  (0,180) 
_Ipanoga_5  -1,362*  0,175  -0,322  -0,192  -0,012  -0,264 
  (0,397)  (0,192)  (0,228)  (0,190)  (0,196)  (0,277) 
lnlaborl  0,128  0,236*  0,178*  0,150*  0,208*  0,015 
  (0,077)  (0,083)  (0,077)  (0,074)  (0,064)  (0,073) 
Lnwl  -0,094  0,101  -0,024  0,025  0,064  0,013 
  (0,214)  (0,151)  (0,194)  (0,192)  (0,144)  (0,128) 
DY92  0,507  0,031  -1,208*  -1,638*  -1,398*  -0,825* 
  (0,336)  (0,400)  (0,350)  (0,300)  (0,338)  (0,368) 
DY93  -0,008  0,331  -0,337  -1,548*  -1,433*  -0,188 
  (0,196)  (0,369)  (0,373)  (0,403)  (0,441)  (0,450) 
DY94  -0,006  0,068  -0,257  -0,208  -1,101*  0,165 
  (0,179)  (0,380)  (0,407)  (0,261)  (0,270)  (0,241) 
DY95  -0,220  -0,371  -0,387  -0,172  -0,824*  0,569 
  (0,193)  (0,279)  (0,347)  (0,240)  (0,288)  (0,311) 
DY96  0,236  -0,229  0,094  0,405  0,068  0,581* 
  (0,285)  (0,413)  (0,266)  (0,231)  (0,246)  (0,292) 
DY97  -0,112  -0,159  -0,018  0,256  -0,631*  0,452 
  (0,183)  (0,354)  (0,326)  (0,241)  (0,290)  (0,341) 
DY98  -0,123  -0,296  -0,329  -0,144  -0,418  0,096 
  (0,523)  (0,345)  (0,316)  (0,211)  (0,246)  (0,271) 
DY99  -0,060  -0,364  -0,009  0,218  -0,569*  0,924* 
  (0,572)  (0,380)  (0,303)  (0,227)  (0,241)  (0,292) 
DY100  0,653  0,044  0,007  0,149  -0,104  0,161 
  (0,624)  (0,307)  (0,314)  (0,250)  (0,241)  (0,252) 
_cons  -1,666  -4,302*  -2,522  -2,861  -3,693*  -3,055* 
  (1,806)  (1,257)  (1,557)  (1,610)  (1,251)  (1,132) 
?
2**    316,3  262,3  333,3  356,5  287 
 
*Statisticaly significant at 5% level 
** Wald  test: both coefficient  Yt-1, Yt-2Yt -1 are jointly equal to 0. Table 6: Results of the Equation (19) - Financial Success of Firms   
 
 
                 
Dependent variable: 
 
Regressors             
 
B09fa 
 
(random effect model) 
 
 
Peu 
 
-0,0016*   
(0,0009)   
DLCvVA 
 
-0,0018 
(0,009)   
absEU 
 
-0,018 
(0,012) 
peuabsEU 
 
0,0005** 
(0,0002) 
e11 
 
-0,011* 
(0,006) 
e13  0,0004   
(0,0003)   
e4m 
 
-0,001*** 
(0,0004) 
e51  0,003 
(0,003) 
e52  0,002 
(0,003) 
LS2 
 
-0,00006 
(0,0008)    
LS3 
 
0,0005   
(0,0006)   
LS4 
 
0,0004 
(0,0007)   
NS2 
 
-0,0001   
(0,0006) 
DD  -0,069 
(0,067)    
constant 
 
 0,094 
(0,127)   
Ind. dummies 
 
Yes 
R2  0,13 
X2 (FE vs. RE)  13,16 
N  601 
 
 
 *,** in *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 Table 7: Random Effect Ordered Probit Model of Expected Solvency of Firms 
 
 
Regressors  Coefficient  Standard Error 
B09fa  4,548624***  0,7381357 
D32v36  -6,262738***  1,027294   
E11  0,267556***  0,0787687   
E13  0,0088334*    0,0050679    
E4m  0,0092936    0,0064251   
E51  0,0615002***    0,0171397   
E52  -0,0601654***  0,02484    
LS2  -0,0472588***    0,0113291 
LS3  -0,0216543**  0,0089836 
LS4  0,002378  0,010672 
NS2  -0,012078    0,0082557   
Dd  3,691746***  0,6742646   
Ind. dummies    YES 
Cut1  0,6474868  1,019876 
Cut2  2,817082***     1,037551 
LR X2  92,37 
N  428 
 
*,** in *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 Table A1: "Results of Sunk Costs: Marginal Effect of the Export Participation 
(comparison of Pooled Probit Model and "Wooldridge Model") 
 
Region EU Russia Croatia BIH FRY Macedonia
Model Probit Woold. Probit Woold. Probit Woold. Probit Woold. Probit Woold Probit Woold.
Yt-1 0.981* 0.954* 0.918* 0.540* 0.913* 0.890* 0.893* 0.871* 0.759* 0.669* 0.907* 0.858*
0,011 0,045 0,021   0,019 0,026 0,017 0,021 0,034 0,051 0,017 0,032
Yt-2/Yt-1=0 0.039* 0,034 0.346* 0,032 0.247* 0.258* 0.493* 0.439* 0.147* 0,087 0.631* 0.552*
0,017 0,023 0,177   0,026 0,03 0,078 0,095 0,076 0,068 0,087 0,124
lnlaborl 0.026* -0,002 0.050* 0,001 0.058* 0,006 0.074* 0,036 0.047* 0,034 0,021 0,011
0,011 0,032 0,015   0,024 0,07 0,026 0,513 0,011 0,022 0,016 0,03
Lnwl -0,0008 -0,023 0,021 0,001 -0,025 0,137 -0,042 -0,077 0,014 -0,021 -0,031 0,036
0,015 0,075 0,029     0,06 0,123 0,076 0,134 0,025 0,041 0,035 0,69
Year dummies and industry dummies included
Marginal effect of dumy variable x = F(x=1) - F(x=0)Graphs 
 
Graph 1: Revenues by markets 
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 Graph 2: Revenues to former Yugoslav markets 
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In this appendix we show  that  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ? ? ? it it it it Y Y ? ?  is proportional to the 
variable current gross profit,  it d .  
 We can write  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ? ? ? it it it it Y Y ? ?   as: 
? ?
? ? ? ?
t
t
it
it it it it i
d
E Y Y
) 1 (
) 0 ( ) 1 ( ? ?  
  where E is an operator of the expected value and i is the discount factor. Since 
E is a linear operator, we have: 
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  Since the expected value of gross profits in given year does not depend on the 
discount factor, we have: 
...
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  Assuming, that gross profits and factors that affect  it follow Markovian 
process of order one (same assumption was made in Roberts and Tybout, 1997 and in 
Das et.al., 2001) we have: 
... ) ( ) ( 2 1 ? ? ? ? ? it it it d E d E d  
Hence 
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